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BARTER, LIQUIDITY AND MARKET
SEGMENTATION
Abstract
This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter
exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade
theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-
wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves
relative to the market outcomes. We then demonstrate that in the
presence of liquidity shocks, introducing a non-monetary
exchange avoids this limitation and enhances trade by (1)
generating liquidity and (2) by segmenting the market place into
low-demand and high-demand customers in a manner which is
impossible with pure monetary exchange. We provide
comparative statics illustrating the importance of each effect and
relevant extensions.
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It is with good reason that the typical economic trade involves the exchange of goods for money; a
commonly accepted money serves to overcome Jevon’s (1875) constraint of a “double coincidence of
wants” that plagues non-monetary exchange. Despite money’s apparent advantage, it remains the
case that even in monetized economies, a large number of trades do not involve monetary transfers
for goods and services. The purpose of this paper is to understand the continued existence of barter
in circumstances where a commonly accepted form of money already exists.
Barter between ﬁrms is signiﬁcant even in monetized economies. First, it has been estimated
that between ten and twenty percent of world trade is characterized by some form of countertrade,
where imports into a country are tied to exports of similar value.1 Second, a considerable amount of
trade between ﬁrms occurs on organized commercial barter markets. At last count, more than 500
such exchanges were operating in the United States with approximately 300,000 ﬁrms participating
as active traders.2 These barter networks trade a great diversity of goods and services. Some
examples include rental cars, hotel rooms, oﬃce equipment, business services, printing, and vehicle
maintenance.3 The International Reciprocal Trade Association estimates that the annual value of
barter trade by North American companies is approximately $10 billion.4
1While these arrangements may involve some cash transfers, they typically have a large component that is either
a simultaneous exchange of goods or a sequential transaction such as a buy-back agreement (where in exchange for a
purchase of plant and equipment, the selling ﬁrm agrees to buy back some portion of output for some speciﬁed period
in the future) or a counter-purchase agreement (where transfers of technologically unrelated goods are promised in
the future). See Hennart (1989), and Hennart and Anderson (1993), Marin and Schnitzer (1995), Ellingsen and
Stole (1996), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and sources cited therein for various theoretical and empirical analyses
of countertrade. The 10-20 percent estimates of countertrade are based on data prior to 1990 when a large portion
of world trade involved Soviet-block economies interacting with free-market economies; today’s estimates are likely
to be substantially lower.
2IRTA (2000) and Kiplinger’s Personal Finance, February 1996 (Roha and Schulhof (1996, p. 103)).
3The exchanges are largely self regulated, although the IRTA provides industry standards for IRTA-member barter
networks. The typical barter exchange charges 10-15 percent per transaction as well as an annual membership fee of
$100-$600 and possibly a monthly maintenance fee of $6-$30. Transaction prices within the exchange are (in theory
at least) identical to outside retail prices, except that the transactions take place in barter scrip.
4These barter exchanges typically operate by creating their own currencies, referred to as barter dollars or scrip.
The standard economic hazard of accepting such scrip is then that it is not generally used as currency so that agents
are restricted to purchasing from the available supply on the barter market. It is the inherent thinness of the barter
exchanges that causes the absence of a double coincidence of wants. In this sense, the barter markets also share a
similarity to local currencies, where communities (or more commonly, businesses within communities) issue coupons
or scrip which become traded as a form of private money. For instance, there is approximately $60,000 of community
money circulating in Ithaca, New York (known as Ithaca Hours), which is acceptable in some but not all stores;
Greco (1994) and Glover (1995) provide an extensive (but largely non-economic) discussion of such local currencies
today. Locally-accepted private currencies were also quite widespread during the Depression era in the United State
(Mitchell and Shafer (1984)); indeed, Irving Fisher (1933) was a notable proponent of private community money
as a means of ending the Depression. We should emphasize that our principal interest in this paper is how such
seemingly ineﬃcient barter-like arrangements can survive in a fully monetized economy (i.e., one with a universally
accepted money), and not in why the supplier of the private money is willing to do so. It is clear that the ability to
issue private money oﬀers the issuer seniorage revenues (see for example Kashyap’s (1995) case study of Canadian
Tire for a interesting example of private coupons creating substantial seniorage for the issuing company). We focus
in this paper on understanding the speciﬁc questions of why private monies which are not universally accepted will
1There is by now a large literature on how barter fares as an alternative to ﬁat money.5 However,
this literature typically treats barter as an ineﬃcient form of exchange that is ultimately dominated
by a commonly accepted form of ﬁat currency. The purpose of this paper is to consider a continued
role for barter arrangements in an economy which already has paper money. To do so, we rely on
the twin themes of liquidity shocks and market power. In particular, we illustrate that an economy
with liquidity shocks is characterized by two separate reasons for non-monetary exchange. First,
and rather straightforward, barter becomes a means of creating liquidity for cash-constrained ﬁrms.
Second, barter becomes a means of market segmentation which ﬁrms can use to increase their proﬁts
and welfare. This latter eﬀect is our primary interest. We will illustrate simple conditions under
which each eﬀect dominates.6
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of market power on the ability of agents to barter in the absence of
liquidity problems. We begin by illustrating how market power in isolation severely restricts barter
(or more generally the bundling of trades). If ﬁrms price at marginal cost, it is obvious that barter
trades can be consummated if, for each agent, the consumption value of the available good desired
by an agent exceeds the production cost of the good that they produce. This is the standard
double coincidence of wants condition. However, when price exceeds marginal cost, equilibrium
barter becomes harder to sustain in the presence of a cash market; this is because the opportunity
cost of barter is now the production cost and the potential lost cash sale. A ﬁrm may not barter
with another even if it is common knowledge that consumption value exceeds production costs,
for the reason that the ﬁrm rationally anticipates that it may sell the good to the other ﬁrm at a
greater proﬁt for cash if it refuses.
This problem becomes particularly acute when a willingness to barter reveals information about
whether the customer would have purchased on the cash market in the absence of barter. We
illustrate this eﬀect in a general framework in Section 2 by showing that if a ﬁrm’s valuation for its
desired good is independent of its costs of production, then there is no mechanism which can improve
upon the standard market allocation without bundling. In other words, there is no possibility to
tie trades in a way that increases trading eﬃciency while simultaneously satisfying the incentive
nonetheless circulate in equilibrium and how their circulation will ultimately aﬀect resource allocation.
5See Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993), Trejos and Wright (1991), Matsuyama, et al. (1993), Williams and
Wright (1994), and Banerjee and Maskin (1996).
6We should be clear at the outset that our interest in non-monetary exchange focuses on situations where the
means of exchange aﬀects ultimate resource allocation. There are some instances where agents could choose not to
use money to trade, but where there is no eﬀect on welfare. For instance, consider the case where two agents both
buy and sell to each other, but where they both are commonly known to have valuations above the price charged by
the other, implying that in absence of barter both would buy on the cash market. In such a setting, there is no loss
(or gain) from simply swapping the goods: barter does not facilitate trade. In our view, this is a rather uninteresting
form of barter as the ultimate resource allocation does not depend on the means of exchange. Consequently, we
restrict attention to situations where barter aﬀects the ultimate resource allocation in a way that at least one party
ﬁnds desirable.
2and participation constraints of each ﬁrm. To see the power of this conclusion, consider a simple
setting in which two producing agents have demands for each other’s output and suppose that it
is known with probability one that each agent’s valuations exceed the production costs, which are
the same for both. In a world without cash markets, it is obvious that barter increases welfare so
that the ﬁrst best can be attained by swapping goods. Yet this can never happen in the presence
of cash markets for the simple reason that any ﬁrm that proposes such a contract reveals that it
would purchase on the “cash market” otherwise. Given this, the other ﬁrm has no reason to agree
to the barter arrangement.7
The consequence of this no-trade-creation theorem is that monopoly power in cash markets
constrains the ability of agents to barter. This, of course, does not get us very far in explaining
how such arrangements can survive in a monetized economy; instead it reinforces the likelihood of
money trades. However, Section 3 illustrates that with the addition of possible liquidity constraints,
our no-trade result no longer applies. We introduce liquidity constraints in Section 3, where ﬁrms
must sell their goods to generate cash. They receive information on the random demands from
their cash customers, but where they place goods on a barter market before knowing the resolution
of demand for sure. In this setting, we illustrate two roles for barter. First, ﬁrms may choose to
barter goods for the simple reason that they see it as unlikely that they will have cash to buy. Thus
barter provides liquidity to ﬁrms which otherwise are constrained from trading. Second, barter can
be used as a means of market segmentation in a way that increases ﬁrm surplus.
How can barter provide a means of ﬁrms segmenting markets on the basis of willingness to pay,
given the result of Section 2? The key is that liquidity constraints give rise to a natural correlation
between valuations (denominated in cash) and opportunity costs which ﬁrms can exploit when
marketing their goods. Consider a ﬁrm which believes that its cash paying customers are unlikely
to buy. This ﬁrm consequently believes its ability to pay for the good is low. Yet the fact that
they cannot sell for cash also means that they have excess inventory: Thus, its opportunity cost of
selling is low and there emerges a natural positive correlation between demands and costs which
can be exploited by a selling ﬁrm.
How does such a correlation generate a role for barter in equilibrium? In the absence of any
correlation, any agent who proposes barter would have purchased on the cash market with at least
as great a probability as suggested by the ﬁrm’s prior. But this is no longer necessarily true when
there are liquidity constraints; instead, a ﬁrm which is likely to have a cash-paying customer will
7This no-trade-improvement result was originally anticipated in the barter game of Ellingsen and Stole (1996).
They demonstrated that if each ﬁrm plays a simple simultaneous swapping game (where swaps occur iﬀ both ﬁrms
agree to them), additional trade creation cannot take place if the original cash prices set by the ﬁrms are the
monopoly proﬁt maximizing prices. The analysis in section 2 of the present paper extends their result to general
trading mechanisms and market structures, conﬁrming their conjecture.
3be unwilling to commit its goods to the barter market for the reason that the good may be taken
before the cash-paying customer arrives. On the other hand, those ﬁrms which believe themselves
to be cash constrained will be happier to make such a commitment as the opportunity cost of
the goods is lower, thereby revealing themselves to be customers on whom the selling ﬁrm should
accept less. In other words, a willingness to supply a good can reveal a low valuation in a way that
breaks the nexus of the no-trade theorem in Section 2.8
The paper therefore illustrates two salient functions of barter exchange: ﬁrst, as a means of
creating liquidity for cash-constrained ﬁrms, and second, as a means of market segmentation. In
Section 3, we identify the importance of each eﬀect on two dimensions. First, the inherent eﬃciency
of barter exchange is important, by which we mean the likelihood that an agent receives his desired
good on the barter market. Increases in the eﬃciency of barter exchange increases the liquidity role
of barter markets for an obvious reason, as the costs of forgoing the cash market falls. However,
increasing the eﬃciency of barter markets has an ambiguous eﬀect on the ability to segment the
market. The reason is that the equilibrium market segmentation requires that barter be desirable to
the cash-constrained ﬁrms but not to the unconstrained customers. Yet an eﬃcient barter market
makes avoiding monopoly cash pricing more attractive. Thus for suﬃciently eﬃcient exchange,
equilibrium market segmentation disappears. The second dimension on which we consider two
eﬀects is the dispersion of liquidity shocks across ﬁrms. At one extreme, all ﬁrms are equally likely
to have cash customers (low dispersion) and at the other we consider the case where some ﬁrms
are almost certainly constrained and others are almost certain to have cash-paying customers (high
dispersion). Here we ﬁnd that as the dispersion of liquidity shocks increase, (i) the likelihood of
trade for liquidity reasons falls, and (ii) the likelihood of trade for segmentation reasons rises. Thus
in environments where idiosyncratic shocks to liquidity are common, the primary catalyst for barter
becomes market segmentation.
Section 4 considers the robustness of our results. Until this point we have assumed the inef-
ﬁciency of the barter market. In this section, we endogenize the eﬃciency of barter, by allowing
multiple customers on the barter market. No pair of customers is assumed to have a double coin-
cidence of wants, implying that demands can be fully satisﬁed only if enough agents arrive on the
barter market. We show that (i) the two functions of barter remain, and (ii) their extent depends
on the value ascribed to consuming the wrong set of goods. In this section, we also extend our
8Note that the literature on barter exchanges emphasizes the characteristics of trading ﬁrms in these terms. For
instance, Greco (1994) describes the dual desires of “disposing of excess inventory” and “conserving their cash”
(p.86), precisely the ingredients we rely upon for our results. The dual roles of barter exchanges in providing both
liquidity and the marketing of excess inventory has also been noted by the International Reciprocal Trade Association
(2000). The IRTA (2000) notes, for example, that “sellers [in barter exchanges] legally extend credit to the collective
membership [of the exchange]” and “barter is a marketing tool, not a tax tool.”
4results to other demands structures, by using a Hotelling model of diﬀerentiation. Here the private
information on demand relates to elasticities of substitution (as in Hotelling), where high valuation
customers have strong preferences for particular goods, but low valuation customers are closer to
indiﬀerent over which good they obtain. Beyond showing that our eﬀects remain in this section,
we identify an alternative role for barter via market segmentation, as low valuation customers are
happier with the random allocation of goods that barter entails. Thus this subsection illustrates
how barter can separate customers on elasticities of substitution.
Another issue of robustness is whether our results are proof from competitive forces. Section 5
considers the eﬀect of multiple barter markets with diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency. We argued above
that market segmentation requires some level of ineﬃciency in barter exchange. But will more
eﬃcient markets arise which ultimately drive out this reason for barter? We show here that dual
barter markets can co-exist in the sense that a perfectly eﬃcient barter market does not drive out a
less eﬃcient counterpart. We see both these extensions as illustrating the robustness of our results.
As noteworthy, this section also illustrates that market segmentation plays an important role as
liquidity generation always moves agents into the most eﬃcient barter market.
We begin in Section 2 by considering the eﬀect of monopoly on the ability of agents to bundle
purchases, of which barter is obviously an example, arriving at our basic no-trade-creation theorem
in the absence of liquidity constraints. Section 3 illustrates how liquidity constraints give rise to
the dual roles of barter through market segmentation and liquidity generation, and the eﬀect of
parameters on each eﬀect. Section 4 illustrates the robustness of our results to endogenizing barter
eﬃciency while Section 5 allows eﬃcient barter exchange to co-exist with a less eﬃcient counterpart.
2 The Limitations of Nonmonetary Exchange:
A No-Trade-Improvement Result
Throughout the paper, we argue that the interaction between market power and liquidity shocks
gives rise to interesting reasons for the prevalence of barter. With this in mind, we begin by
considering the diﬃculty of generating barter-like arrangements in a monopolistic setting without
liquidity constraints. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that if (i) payoﬀs to market participants are
quasi-linear in money and (ii) consumption-related private information is independently distributed
relative to production-related private information, then each ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy with
respect to its population of consumers is immune to renegotiation by any two ﬁrms with potential
double-coincidences of wants who meet each other and attempt to improve bilateral trade. This
result is not dependent upon the market structure (whether the ﬁrms are oligopolists or monopolists
5in their respective markets) or the dimensionality of production or uncertainty. It only requires that
the initial pricing strategies are optimal given the distribution of demand parameters of consumers
(and “consuming” ﬁrms) and that preferences are decomposable and can be aggregated (which is
implied by (i) and (ii) above).
Initially, our analysis is limited to two ﬁrms and uncertainty over demand parameters, but the
results are then generalized. Consider two ﬁrms, A and B, each a monopolist on his own separated
product market; there is no competitive externality as they do not share customers. Each potential
buyer in product market i has private information regarding his willingness to pay which is given
by a demand parameter, vi, independently drawn from set Vi according to some commonly known
distribution. The consumer surplus for a buyer of type vi on market i is given by the quasi-linear
payoﬀ function
U(vi) = u(q,vi) − t,
where q is quantity consumed and t is a total transfer or payment made to the ﬁrm. Firms are
risk neutral and produce output at a constant marginal cost, C(q) = cq. As is well known, an
optimal nonlinear pricing contract can be implemented with a direct revelation mechanism of the
form µi = {qi(v),ti(v)}v∈Vi. Let U(µi(v0)|v) ≡ u(qi(v0),v) − ti(v0) be a consumer’s surplus from
participating in the mechanism µi with type v while reporting type v0.
It is useful to begin by considering the case where there is no possibility that ﬁrms could have de-
mands for each other’s product. Let µ∗
i denote the optimal mechanism that a such proﬁt-maximizing
monopolist would choose, which we assume to be unique and deterministic.9 Speciﬁcally,
µ∗
i = arg max
µi∈IC∩IR
Evi[ti(vi) − cq(vi)],
where µi ∈ IC ∩ IR implies that µi is (interim) incentive compatible and individually rational. As
is well known, µ∗
i will typically induce consumption distortions across buyers in order to reduce
the information rents to the inframarginal customers. In the simple case in which u(q,v) = vq
and q ∈ [0,1], we have the familiar monopoly distortion in which a single price, p > c, is set for
q = 1. More generally, the optimal monopoly oﬀering will contain multiple price-quantity pairs and
exhibit nonlinearities, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978), for example.
9We could easily extend the analysis to incorporate random mechanisms without much diﬃculty. The assumption
of uniqueness, however, allows us to reach a rather powerful conclusion regarding the renegotiation of these optimal
pricing schemes – the schemes are strongly renegotiation proof (i.e., there does not exist any equilibrium to the rene-
gotiation game under which the original pricing schemes are renegotiated). Without uniqueness, strong renegotiation
proofness is no longer clear as a ﬁrm may choose to renegotiate to a new trading allocation which has identical utility
outcomes for itself but possibly diﬀerent outcomes for other ﬁrms in the economy. Note, however, that in the case of
monopolists, non-linear pricing schemes are typically unique under simple concavity assumptions (e.g., Mussa-Rosen
(1978)).
6We now extend the model and assume that each ﬁrm is also a potential customer on the other
ﬁrm’s market. To be precise, ﬁrm A (B) draws a demand valuation v for ﬁrm B’s (A’s) good from
the same distribution as other customers of ﬁrm B (A). In addition, the ﬁrms retain their own
other customers, the set a for ﬁrm A, and the set b for ﬁrm B. As a consequence, each ﬁrm faces
two potential types of buyers – buyers who do not also oﬀer a product which the ﬁrm wishes to
consume (we refer to this potential buyer as simply a ﬁrm’s own “customer”) and a potential buyer
who is a monopolist on the other product market and oﬀers a good for sale in which the ﬁrm is
possibly interested (we refer to this buyer as a consuming “ﬁrm”). Graphically, ﬁrms A and B oﬀer
goods to each other and to their captive customers a for ﬁrm A and b for ﬁrm B; arrows indicate
potential consumers of a ﬁrm’s output.
Figure 1. Potential selling relationships
a b B A
In this setting, could the two ﬁrms design an alternative trading mechanism between themselves
which has less economic distortion than the monopoly mechanism, µ∗ ≡ (µ∗
A,µ∗
B)? One reasonable
conjecture is that the monopolists could “trade” their monopoly power with each other and simulta-
neously reduce their (possibly nonlinear) prices between themselves. We show that this conjecture
is incorrect, however, by demonstrating that the original mechanism µ∗ is robust to renegotiation
by the ﬁrms: in particular, there does not exist any Bayesian equilibrium to a class of renegotiation
games in which the original monopoly mechanism is renegotiated.
To understand the robustness of the monopoly mechanism µ∗, we investigate whether, after
learning their valuations, there is an alternative mechanism which either ﬁrm can suggest, which is
acceptable to the other, and which possibly reduces the consumption distortions inherent in µ∗.
To do so, we begin by ﬁrst considering whether the monopoly mechanism, µ∗, is interim incentive
eﬃcient, as deﬁned in Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983). An incentive compatible mechanism µ is
interim incentive eﬃcient if and only if there does not exist another incentive compatible mechanism
µ0 which interim dominates µ: i.e., Ui(µ0|vj) ≥ Ui(µ|vj) ∀ i,j 6= i, ∀ vj ∈ Vj with at least one
strict inequality, where Ui is the expected utility of agent i with demand type vj for ﬁrm j’s
7product assuming the incentive compatible mechanism µ is played truthfully by both players.10
If a mechanism is interim incentive eﬃcient when positive welfare weights are restricted to those
of a single ﬁrm, we say that the mechanism is undominated for that ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that µ∗ is
indeed interim incentive eﬃcient and undominated for each ﬁrm, and in addition, it is incentive
“safe” in the sense of Myerson (1983) (i.e., µ is safe iﬀ, ﬁxing i, for every type vj ∈ Vj µ is incentive
compatible given {vj} is known by all players). The proof of all theorem is supplied in the appendix.
Theorem 1 The bilateral monopoly mechanism, µ∗, is interim incentive eﬃcient, undominated
for each ﬁrm, and safe.
The logic of theorem 1 is simple: the worst type ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms that receive the least amount
of rents) strictly prefer µ∗ to any other mechanism because it uniquely maximizes their aggregate
payoﬀs subject to incentive compatibility and participation. Safety follows immediately from the
decomposition of the information constraints into consumption and production components. Ac-
cordingly, in the appendix we consider an even richer set of market environments with an arbitrary
number of ﬁrms, each exclusively controlling a vector of goods and having demands which allow for
interactions in consumption. Providing that demand and production parameters are separate and
independently distributed and marginal costs of production are constant, we can extend Theorem
1 appropriately.
Theorem 2 The general mechanism, µ∗, which is associated with the Nash equilibrium in pricing
strategies among a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms with independent demand and production preferences is
interim incentive eﬃcient, undominated for each ﬁrm, and safe.
We now consider non-cooperative games in which one of the ﬁrms oﬀers a new mechanism as a
bilateral renegotiation oﬀer. Following Myerson’s (1983) inscrutability principle, we can view the
mechanism-selection game as a communication game induced from the original Bayesian game and
apply the revelation principle. In short, we can focus on incentive compatible mechanism proposals
by an informed party which do not reveal any information at the proposal stage. Given that µ∗ is
safe and interim undominated (what Myerson refers to as a “strong solution”), a powerful result
applies.
Theorem 3 (Myerson, 1983) The initial monopolistic pricing mechanism, µ∗, is the unique
strong solution (with respect to interim expected utilities). Moreover, any other mechanism ˆ µ 6= µ∗
which is proposed by ﬁrm i such that the set S = {v ∈ Vj|Ui(ˆ µ|v) > Ui(µ∗|v)} is non-empty is not
incentive compatible for types in S, and hence not inscrutable.
10In the present setting, note that the i subscript denotes ﬁrm i and hence the valuation parameter is drawn from
the distribution for ﬁrm j.
8Myerson’s result is quite intuitive. To understand the proof, suppose that S, the preferred set
of mechanisms, were nonempty and ˆ µ incentive compatible over S. In such a case, a new incentive
compatible mechanism could be constructed (µ∗ for all types not in S and ˆ µ for all types in S)
which interim dominates µ∗. Because µ∗ is interim incentive eﬃcient, this is not possible, and
so ˆ µ must not be incentive compatible. To understand uniqueness, suppose to the contrary that
˜ µ was also undominated and safe and yielded diﬀerent interim expected utilities. Then a better
mechanism could be constructed by combining the two mechanisms, using ˜ µ whenever it yielded
more expected interim utility than µ∗ and vice versa, generating a dominating mechanism.11 As
such, µ∗ is unique in interim utilities, as well as being immune to replacement.
The import of the three preceding theorems is that, if either ﬁrm was in a position to propose
a new mechanism as an alternative µ∗ (i.e., diﬀerent interim utilities), the proposal should be
rejected by the other ﬁrm. To make this statement precise, consider a speciﬁc extensive form
renegotiation game. Suppose one ﬁrm is selected with a randomizing device to make a take-it-or-
leave-it renegotiation oﬀer to the another. If the oﬀer is accepted, the new mechanism is played
between the two ﬁrms; if it is rejected, the original mechanism is played. Myerson (1983) has
demonstrated that there exists beliefs for the non-oﬀering ﬁrm such that a strong solution is a
Bayesian equilibrium outcome. In the present setting, because µ∗ is unique, we can apply the
inscrutability principle and deduce that µ∗ is in fact the only outcome which can emerge in a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Theorem 4 The initial monopolistic pricing mechanism, µ∗, is strongly renegotiation proof.
A few remarks are in order. First, in any equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which
the allocation is renegotiated in some subgame, we can replace the equilibrium allocation with
an inscrutable mechanism µ0 which incorporates the various outcomes of the game and allows
the oﬀering principal to make an announcement of private information to select a particular sub-
allocation. It is without loss of generality to restrict attention to such direct and inscrutable
mechanisms and equilibria in which truth-telling is an equilibrium strategy. Theorem 3, however,
says that any mechanism which provides positive utility gains for some oﬀerer over the status quo
mechanism cannot be incentive compatible, and hence it is not inscrutable. Such a mechanism
cannot be oﬀered and accepted in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. What remains is that a
mechanism which has equivalent utility consequences for the oﬀering ﬁrm (but distinct consequences
11Other results concerning µ
∗ can also be shown. It is durable (Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983)), it is an expecta-
tional equilibrium (Myerson (1983)), and a neutral optimum (Myerson (1983)). All of these notions underscore the
likelihood that bilateral monopolists will be unable to renegotiate their initial customer contracts in order to give
each other a price reduction.
9for the other ﬁrm(s)) will not be oﬀered. Because we have assumed that µ∗
i is unique in maximizing
ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt, we can eliminate this possibility.12
Second, given the intuition behind Theorem 3, it seems likely that other non-cooperative renego-
tiation games will have similar diﬃculties reaching a new trading allocation. Along these lines, for
example, one can demonstrate that µ∗ is “durable” in the terminology of Holmstr¨ om and Myerson
(1983), and therefore µ∗ is weakly renegotiation proof in a game in which all players simultaneously
decide whether or not to replace µ∗ with a given alternative and equilibria are required to be trem-
bling hand perfect.13 In sum, barter and related bundling arrangements are severely restricted by
the ability of agents to extract rents through their individual monopoly pricing. It is for this reason
that we now turn to the role of liquidity constraints to soften this no-trade-creation outcome.
3 Barter in a Liquidity-Constrained Trading Framework
Conceptually the only change that we make from the previous section is to address the possibility
that cash customers will not purchase for exogenous reasons, implying that the ﬁrm does not have
the required cash to purchase goods. We furhter restrict attention to a simpler model in which
q ∈ {0,1}, and C(q) = cq if the ﬁrm has production capacity and C(q) = ∞ otherwise. We
assume each ﬁrm has a production capacity of one. We maintain two product markets with a
single monopolist on each market. As a further simpliﬁcation, we assume that in each market the
customer’s marginal valuation for consumption is distributed independently and identically with
prior probability ˆ α of value v and corresponding probability (1 − ˆ α) that value is v < v.
Given this description of the product market, the optimal product market monopoly mechanism
in absence of any bilateral trading opportunities is to set a price at either p = v or p = v, depending
upon the posterior probability of v = v; it is never optimal to reduce the value of the good (e.g., sell
probabilities of consumption), so price discrimination is never an optimal pricing strategy. Later,
12This theorem is also closely related to Maskin and Tirole’s (1992) analysis of a class of renegotiation games led
by an informed principal. Because µ
∗
i is the unique maximizing mechanism for the lowest type proposer, it is part of
a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation in Maskin and Tirole’s (1992) terminology. In their more structured economic
environment, µ
∗ is would therefore strongly renegotiation proof.
13A simple example taken from Ellingsen and Stole (1996) makes the logic for this result clear. Consider the case
of two ﬁrms where each has a unit demand for the other’s good with valuation v uniformly distributed on [0,1];
costs are taken to be zero. In this setting, it is common knowledge that productive eﬃciency requires trade to take
place. Optimal monopoly prices for each good are p =
1
2. Now consider a simple trading game in which each ﬁrm
simultaneously announces “barter” or “no barter”. In the case of both ﬁrms announcing “barter,” the goods are
immediately swapped; otherwise, the ﬁrms are free to purchase from one another on the traditional marketplace.
When each ﬁrm is evaluating its announcement, it takes the other ﬁrms announcement as “barter” (since otherwise
the barter game is irrelevant). But conditional on saying “barter,” in any equilibrium the other ﬁrm’s valuation must
be higher for having chosen “barter” than not choosing barter. As such, the largest set of barter trades which can
be supported as an equilibrium is for each ﬁrm to announce barter iﬀ its valuation exceeds
1
2; but whenever trade
would occur via barter, it would have otherwise occurred on the traditional marketplace. Trade cannot be improved.
10we will introduce assumptions on the underlying parameters of the model to assure that p = v in
all pricing subgames so as to ensure a monopoly distortion in the cash market. In such a case,
µ∗
i = {(0,0),(1,v)}.
Our results rely on the assumption that ﬁrms which suﬀer low demand are likely to be both
cash constrained and hold excess inventory. We formalize this association by assuming that (i) a
ﬁrm has only a single unit of capacity, and (ii) a ﬁrm can only get money to buy a good by selling
its good for money. As a result, it will only buy a good on the product market if both its valuation
is not less than the posted price and it has cash from a previous sale. Absent a sale, a ﬁrm is
eﬀectively liquidity constrained and cannot purchase on the cash market.
A barter oﬀer occurs when either ﬁrm oﬀers a unit of output in a one-for-one exchange with
another ﬁrm. Nonetheless, there may be some loss in exchange, represented by a ﬁnal valuation
of consumption for the bartered good of λv, where λ ≤ 1; we will leave the determination of λ
unmodelled at this point but return to the issue in section 4. As such, the net physical value to a
ﬁrm from a successful bartered exchange is λv − c. Standard double coincidence of wants would
then be satisﬁed if λv ≥ c. However, as we emphasized above, under monopoly there will be an
additional cost of trading on the barter market, namely, the opportunity cost of a (possibly) lost
sale on the product market. This can occur either through the cash customer otherwise willing to
buy or through the “ﬁrm customer” buying on the cash market after it makes a sale to its own
cash customer.
The timing of the market game is as follows. First, nature draws for each ﬁrm a demand
parameter for the other ﬁrm’s good, v ∈ {v,v}, according to the prior distribution ˆ α. Additionally,
each ﬁrm receives a market forecast for its own customer’s demand parameter. The forecast is
either high demand, α, or low demand, α < α, where α and α represent posterior estimates of the
probability that v = v. Thus, we will say ﬁrms with α = α are illiquid (or liquidity-constrained)
ﬁrms and those with α = α are liquid (or not liquidity-constrained). Note that these descriptions
are made before the ultimate realization of demand. The forecast is low with probability φ and
high with probability (1 − φ). The prior estimate is therefore ˆ α = φα + (1 − φ)α. We assume
that this forecast applies only to the ﬁrm’s own customer; ﬁrm demands are assumed to be drawn
according to the prior, ˆ α, regardless of the forecast for the captive customer markets.
Following the realization of the demand posterior, each ﬁrm makes a decision as to whether or
not to oﬀer its unit on the barter exchange. If both ﬁrms A and B post oﬀers, exchange take place;
otherwise, no barter occurs.
Finally, if the ﬁrms retain their unit of production capacity for any reason, they enter their
cash markets and set prices. Product market trades take place over two sub-periods. In the ﬁrst
11sub-period, the each ﬁrm’s own customer decides whether or not to purchase a good. In the second
sub-period, any ﬁrm having made a cash sale in the ﬁrst sub-period and having a valuation at least
as great as the market price buys a good from the other ﬁrm. At this point, the trading game
ends. We assume throughout the analysis that arbitrage of goods is not possible between the cash
customers and the consuming ﬁrms. Figure 2 summarizes the timing.
Figure 2. Timing
time
enter or pass on            
barter exchange;
possibly swap
enter cash market      
if inventory exists;
possibly buy or sell
learn demand 
Before considering the role of barter, we initially address how ﬁrms set prices. First, in the
absence of barter, a ﬁrm will always ﬁnd it optimal to price at p = v providing
(α + (1 − α)ˆ α2)(v − c) > v − c. (1)
Here the probability of a sale is the probability that a ﬁrm’s own customer purchases the good
(which is at least α) plus the probability that if the ﬁrm’s customer does not purchase the good
(with complementary probability (1 − α)) and that the other ﬁrm has v = v (with probability ˆ α)
and its customer will purchase from it (with probability ˆ α) thereby inducing the ﬁrm to purchase
itself. We maintain this assumption throughout the paper so that a cash market without a barter
exchange exhibits a monopoly distortion.
This in itself is not suﬃcient to rule out price changes after the ﬁrm has been to the barter
market. For instance, if a ﬁrm realizes that by failing to exchange goods on the barter market it is
dealing with a low valuation ﬁrm, then it may wish to change its price to p = v. In this sense, the
barter market can serve a role as a learning device to provide ﬁrms information on the valuations
of ﬁrm-customers on the other side of the market which can be used when setting prices. We do
not believe that this is an integral role of barter markets, so we desire to exclude post-barter price
revisions. To this end, note that price revisions arise because the ﬁrms’ beliefs about the valuations
of customers change when a ﬁrm fails to show at the barter market by enough to make a revision
desirable. We mute these eﬀects by assuming that with some probability, eﬃcient barter trades
do not occur as the two parties simply do not meet. If this probability is suﬃciently large, then
12there is little revision in the beliefs of ﬁrms from the fact that no trade occurred on the barter
market, thus retaining v as the chosen monopoly price, given the assumption above. We make this
assumption solely to exclude what we feel is an unreasonable role for barter which is a contrivance
of our stylized timing.14
3.1 Equilibria
At the time of deciding whether or not to post a good on the barter exchange, each ﬁrm pri-
vately knows its demand forecast v and its own demand parameter α: thus, its type is (v,α) ∈
{(v,α),(v,α),(v,α),(v,α)}. When making a decision whether or not to enter the barter exchange,
a ﬁrm should take as given that the other ﬁrm has decided to barter, for otherwise the decision
to barter is irrelevant. In order to determine the opportunity cost of barter, ﬁrm A must make
an assessment as to the probability that the ﬁrm B would have purchased on the cash market
had ﬁrm A not posted a good on the barter market. We denote this equilibrium probability as
Φ ≡ Prob[v = v & ﬁrm has cash|barter]. Note that Φ will generally exceed the unconditional
probability of v = v and the ﬁrm having cash. This is a form of a winner’s curse, and is precisely
the economics behind the no-trade results of section 2.
Having deﬁned Φ, the decision to barter is made by a ﬁrm iﬀ
∆(v,α) ≡ λv − c − [α + (1 − α)Φ](v − c) > 0. (2)
The ﬁrst two terms represent the physical net beneﬁt from barter; the third term represents the
opportunity cost on the product market. Speciﬁcally, with probability α the ﬁrm receives demand
from its captive customer, and with probability (1 − α)Φ the ﬁrm does not sell to its captive
customer but does sell to the other ﬁrm; in both events, the proﬁt earned is (v − c). Given that
Φ ∈ [0,1] is determined as part of the equilibrium in the barter-cash trading game, ∆(v,α) is
an increasing function in v and a nonincreasing function of α. As such, whenever (v,α) prefers
14Allowing for such price revisions does not alter the qualitative nature of our results. We have also solved a model
where illiquid ﬁrms would like to change their prices to v if the absence of trade on the barter market reveals that
the “ﬁrm-customer” has valuation v. In this extension we additionally assume that (i) α(v − c) ≥ v − c, so liquid
ﬁrms prefer to charge v, (ii) those ﬁrms who sell at v do not have suﬃcient cash to buy the other good at v, and (iii)
cash customers get ﬁrst choice on the cash market. In this setting, we show that the same set of equilibria continue
to arise as described below, though the exact parameterizations change in some instances.
There are other equally valid approaches to muting the post-barter price-revision eﬀect. For instance, if we assume
each ﬁrm has a large number, n, of customers in the captive market who value the good at v = v with probability
one and only one customer with truly uncertain demand, then p = v is optimal for any posterior on the nth marginal
buyer; in such a model we would have to make an additional assumption that a ﬁrm with value v = v will only buy
at price p = v if it has made n + 1 sales and that capacity is n + 1. More generally, we simply need an assumption
that the eﬀect of the barter market on beliefs is small, which is reasonable when the barter market is small relative
to the cash market.
13to barter, so does (v,α); and whenever (v,α) prefers to barter, so does (v,α). Thus, excluding
the case in which no ﬁrm barters (which is always an equilibrium for the usual search-externality
reason), there are ﬁve potential classes of pure-strategy equilibria in the barter game: (1) (v,α)
type barters, (2) both (·,α) types barter, (3) both (v,·) types barter, (4) (v,α), (v,α) and (v,α)
barter, (5) all four ﬁrm types barter. The following lemma states that only the ﬁrst three classes
of equilibria are possible.
Lemma 1 Pure-strategy equilibria of classes (4) and (5) do not exist.
The impact of the lemma is that there are three equilibria conﬁgurations of interest, ignoring
the equilibrium in which no one goes the barter exchange.






First consider the case in which all high valuation v ﬁrms barter. Then both liquid and illiquid
ﬁrms enter the barter market for the reason that the barter exchange is serving a pure liquidity
role, allowing high demand customers to exchange goods in the absence of money. We label this
the “liquidity equilibrium”. By contrast, in the case in which all low liquidity, α = α, ﬁrms barter,
the barter exchange is serving a role in segmenting the market place and increasing consumption.
In particular, ﬁrms which are liquidity constrained will enter the barter market, selling on the cash
market only if they ﬁnd no one there. The danger that the illiquid ﬁrms face in going to the barter
market is that the exchange may also attract high valuation, liquid ﬁrms. But the correlation
between willingness to pay and opportunity cost can serve to resolve this concern because those
ﬁrms which do not face liquidity constraints do not believe themselves likely to have the excess
inventory that could be used on the barter market. With such correlation, ﬁrms may be able to
market their goods on the barter market without fearing that their liquid customers will be tempted
14to enter. In this way, non-monetary exchange can segment the market; we refer to this equilibrium
as the “segmentation equilibrium”.
Note most importantly that this segmentation cannot occur without the barter market. This
is for the simple reason that in order to illustrate a low willingness to pay cash, the ﬁrm must be
willing to sacriﬁce a unit of its output on the barter market. Thus, forgoing the prospect of cash
sales serves to illustrate that willingness to pay is low and so potential sellers should be willing to
accept less from them. Note also that barter here increases the propensity to trade as low valuation
ﬁrms are now consuming the good when before they were excluded. The equilibrium in which only
the high-valuation, low-demand ﬁrms trade amongst themselves is a hybrid of both these variations.
We consider each of these cases below in our characterization theorem.
Theorem 5 The following is a complete characterization of pure-strategy barter equilibria.
1. An equilibrium in which ﬁrm type (v,α) exclusively posts goods on the barter exchange exists
iﬀ the following parameter condition is satisﬁed:
1
v




[c + (v − c)(2 − α)α],
1
v
[c + (v − c)(α + (1 − α)α)]

< 1.
2. A low-demand equilibrium in which ﬁrms with α = α exclusively post goods on the barter
exchange exists iﬀ the following parameter conditions are satisﬁed:
1
v
[c + (v − c)[α + (1 − α)αˆ α] ≤ λ ≤
1
v
[c + (v − c)(α + (1 − α)ˆ αα] < 1.
3. A high-valuation equilibrium in which ﬁrms with v = v exclusively post goods on the barter
exchange exists iﬀ the following parameter conditions are satisﬁed:
1
v
[c + (v − c)[α + (1 − α)ˆ α] ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Additionally, the parameter values which support equilibria of class (3) are inconsistent with those
of classes (1) and (2).
Theorem 5 characterizes the three types of equilibria. First, there is the equilibrium where
all high valuations customers barter (v,.), the liquidity equilibrium. The only case where market
segmentation does not occur is in this equilibrium. Second, there is a range of parameters where
all constrained ﬁrms barter (·,α). Finally, there is an equilibrium where only high valuation, cash
constrained ﬁrms barter. The parameter values which satisfy the requirements for the liquidity
equilibrium are disjoint from those of the other two. Note ﬁnally that there is no equilibrium
15where all ﬁrms barter, so that the desire to create liquidity is not large enough to warrant all ﬁrms
bartering. In other words, monopoly pricing continues to act as a constraint on trade, as in Section
2.
3.2 Comparative Statics: Barter Eﬃciency and the Dispersion of Shocks
Our interest is ultimately in determining when each eﬀect is important. Tos do so, we consider the
eﬀect of two relevant variables. First, we address the eﬀect of changing the intrinsic eﬃciency of
the barter market, λ. Second, we consider the eﬀect of heterogeneity of the population by adopting
the following lower-dimension parameterization of the model, measuring the dispersion of demand
shocks to ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we let δ ≡ α−α represent a parameter of mean-preserving dispersion
so that δ = 0 corresponds to α = α = ˆ α and δ = 1 corresponds to α = 0 and α = 1 for a ﬁxed ˆ α.15
Thus δ = 0 implies that all ﬁrms are identical while δ = 1 implies that some ﬁrms are certain to
have cash customers and others have no possibility of such customers.
We do not provide formal theorems on the comparative statics of the model, but instead provide
parameterizations to illustrate what we feel are robust observations. In particular, we set ˆ α = q
v−c
v−c to guarantee that absent the barter market, each ﬁrm would choose to set p = v: i.e.,
(α + (1 − α)ˆ α2)(v − c) > v − c for all α ∈ (0,1). For a given set of parameters v, v and c, we
then graphically illustrate the entire regions of δ and λ for which each equilibria exist. This is done
below in Figure 4 for the case in which v = 4, v = 1 and c = 0.
15Such a parameterization requires that α = (1 − δ)ˆ α, α = (1 − δ)ˆ α + δ, and φ = 1 − ˆ α.
16Figure 4. Equilibria under various Parameters
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Figure 4 identiﬁes the parameter values under which the three equilibria can be supported. Most
importantly, the eﬀects of the two variables diﬀer depending on whether we consider the liquidity
equilibrium (v,·) or either of the equilibria which involve market segmentation, (·,α) or (v,α).
First consider the eﬀect of changing λ. This unambiguously increases the the likelihood of ﬁrms
trading for liquidity reasons (i.e., for any level of dispersion, increasing λ makes the (v,·) equilibrium
more likely). This should not be surprising as more eﬃcient barter markets will result in liquid
ﬁrms being more willing to forego the cash market for the barter market. But remember that the
segmentation results rely on barter being desirable for (at least some) illiquid ﬁrms but undesirable
for the liquid ﬁrms. As a result, initially increasing λ from zero makes market segmentation more
likely (as the illiquid ﬁrms are more likely to enter) but ultimately, if λ increases too much market
segmentation becomes impossible (as the liquid ﬁrms now ﬁnd it attractive). Therefore, moderate
eﬃciency levels for barter aid market segmentation at the cost of liquidity generation, while highly
eﬃcient barter markets will eliminate market segmentation.
Second, note that the eﬀect of dispersion diﬀers between the two types of equilibria. Increases
in δ unambiguously reduce the likelihood of the liquidity equilibrium. This arises for the simple
reason that as dispersion rises, the probability of a cash trade increases for the liquid ﬁrms, which
are thus less willing to place goods on the barter market. By contrast, this aids the ability of
ﬁrms to segment their market. More speciﬁcally, as dispersion rises in the (·,α) equilibrium con-
ﬁguration, the illiquid ﬁrms ﬁnd the barter market more attractive (as they are less likely to have
17cash customers) while the liquid customers increasingly prefer the cash market. Both eﬀects lead
to easier market segmentation so holding λ constant, increases in δ increase the likelihood of the
market segmentation equilibria with (·,α) ﬁrms bartering. The existence of the other segmentation
equilibrium – only type-(v,α) ﬁrms bartering – does not depend monotonically on δ. For low levels
of dispersion, increases in dispersion increase the likelihood of existence; but for moderate levels of
dispersion, further increases in δ reduce the likelihood of existence. This latter eﬀect arises because
higher dispersion induce type-(v,α) ﬁrms to also enter, destroying the single-ﬁrm segmentation
equilibrium.
4 Multilateral Barter and the Source of Barter Frictions
So far, we have left the ineﬃciency of barter (1 − λ) as an exogenous variable. Ultimately, this
reﬂects the absence of a double coincidence of wants. But the likelihood of a double coincidence of
wants depends on the supply of ﬁrms in the barter market, which itself depends on the equilibrium
strategies of the parties. As a result, we consider the robustness of our results to endogenizing λ.
To do so, we add a third ﬁrm, C, and make the trading relationships amongst the ﬁrms cyclic.
Introducing the third ﬁrm and the cyclic nature of demand generates a danger that a ﬁrm which
places its good on the barter market, trades its output to another ﬁrm with an undesirable good.
Figure 5 gives the trading relations between the agents.





Thus, ﬁrm A has good B as its preferred good, but only ﬁrm C has good A as its preferred
18option. Thus there is no bilateral double coincidence of wants. Each has its own independent cash
customer, i, for ﬁrm I. The timing is unaltered except for an additional third sub-period in the
cash game to allow for a ﬁrm’s own-customer cash sale to inject liquidity into the cash market and
circulate fully. For example, suppose all ﬁrm’s are v types, but only ﬁrm A sells for cash in the
ﬁrst sub-period; in the second sub-period, A buys from C; in the third sub-period, C buys from B.
The barter market is assumed to operate as follows. First, if only one agent shows up, no
trade is consummated and that ﬁrm returns to the product market in the hope of selling its good.
Second, if all three ﬁrms show up, eﬃcient trade occurs where each party gets its preferred good.
Finally, if only two ﬁrms show up, we assume that trade is consummated between the two ﬁrms.
Note that this implies that one of the ﬁrms must must obtain its less preferred good. Thus, if ﬁrms
A and C arrive on the barter market, ﬁrm C obtains its preferred good while ﬁrm A is left with its
less preferred alternative.16 The equilibrium probability that the desired good is indeed obtained
by a ﬁrm is λ, though remember that here we more generally allow an additional value to barter
trade through as possible value from consuming (or storing) the “wrong” good. Speciﬁcally, we
ascribe a value to the utility generated by the less preferred good, which we denote by s(v), with
0 ≤ s(v) ≤ v. We will consider diﬀerent parameterizations of s(v) below.
Introducing a third ﬁrm has two eﬀects on the model. First, we endogenize λ through the
possibility that the ﬁrm is left holding its less preferred good. Consider the incentives of ﬁrm A,
which desires good B. It receives s(v) if it receives good C, which occurs if A and C enter but B
does not. Let ρ measure the equilibrium probability that a ﬁrm goes to the barter market. Then
conditional on A entering, there is a probability 2ρ−ρ2 that at least one other ﬁrm will also enter
and so some trade will be consummated. Therefore, given some trade being consummated, there




2−ρ that trade will involve only A and C, and so ﬁrm A ends
up with its less preferred good. Let γ =
1−ρ
2−ρ. Then the probability of A getting its preferred good
is 1 − γ.
The second eﬀect of introducing multilateral barter is that the character of Φ is more complex
as in some cases the opportunity cost of the barter market is a lost sale on a ﬁrm who is not on the
barter market, whereas in the previous case it was only necessary to evaluate this cost conditional
on the potential ﬁrm customer being on the barter market. How this aﬀects the updating depends
on the particular equilibrium being played.
16The workings of the barter market are essentially a metaphor for scrip-in-advance requirements. That is, typically
commercial barter exchanges require ﬁrms to sell goods for barter scrip before purchasing goods. The risk of such a
transaction is that the demanded good is never posted on the exchange but the posting ﬁrm loses its unit of output
nonetheless.
19Given these eﬀects, the net value of barter is now represented by
∆(v,α) ≡ (1 − γ)v + γs(v) − c − [α + (1 − α)Φ](v − c) > 0,
with Φ and γ suitably determined by the equilibrium conﬁguration of bartering ﬁrms. We now
consider various parametrizations of s(v), where we do not provide formal proofs of our results;
instead, we simply provide simulations of the model to illustrate what we feel are the important
eﬀects.
4.1 No Value to the Less Preferred Good
We begin by considering the case where there is no value to the less preferred good, s(v) = 0. When
the non-preferred good has low salvage value, market segmentation is likely to become less common.
The reason for this is that low valuation consumers ﬁnd the cash market increasingly preferable.
Consistent with this prediction, simulations of our model illustrate that the the segmentation
equilibrium becomes less likely as the salvage value falls to zero, suggesting that the value of the
alternative goods on the barter market directly aﬀects the ability of barter to segment the market
for customers.
4.2 Positive Salvage Value
Now consider the more interesting case where the less preferred good has some value which is inde-
pendent of the valuation the ﬁrm places on its preferred good. For example, it may be possible to
sell it at a discount to another possible buyer, or it may be that the ﬁrm can hold onto barter scrip
which can be used at a future date. We assume that the salvage value is give by s(v) = s. The key
diﬀerence between this and the previous case it that the barter market becomes more attractive
and so opportunities for market segmentation open up.
Example. As in the case of bilateral exchange, we can lower the dimension of our problem by
ﬁxing ˆ α and parameterizing the degree of dispersion, δ ≡ α−α. This is done below in Figure 6 for
the case in which v = 4, v = 1, c = 0, and the salvage value of a non-ideal barter good is 3
4v.
20Figure 6. Equilibria under Various Parameters































_ (. ,  ) a
_ (v,  )
_
a
The three components of this ﬁgure give parameter conﬁgurations where each type of equilibrium
arises. The bottom graph identiﬁes the case where the liquidity equilibrium arises. Note however
that in this case it is not possible to exogenously vary the eﬃciency of the barter market, since this
is tied down by the probability of entering the barter market and the nature of the equilibrium;
21the eﬃciency of the barter market, however, is independent of δ. In this numerical example, the
endogenous ineﬃciency of the barter market for the (v,α)-equilibrium is λ = .57 (in other words,
with probability 0.43, each agent receives the wrong good on the barter market); the ineﬃciency of
the barter market for the (·,α)-equilibrium is λ = .69; and the ineﬃciency of the barter market for
the (v,·)-equilibrium is λ = .64. We can address the feasibility of the equilibria by varying δ at each
value of λ. The liquidity equilibrium (i.e., (v,·)-types barter) can be supported so long as δ does
not exceed δ∗
3, at which point the high valuation liquid ﬁrms ﬁnd the cash market too attractive.
The middle graph gives parameter values under which the segmentation equilibrium (·,α) exists;
here for the equilibrium λ, segmentation arises if δ exceeds δ∗
2. The top graph provides the wide
range of parameters for which the equilibrium where only (v,α) trades. Note also that the same
comparative statics on δ continue to hold here, where more dispersion makes market segmentation
more likely and the liquidity equilibrium less likely. Therefore, allowing salvage value for goods
implies results similar to those in Section 3.
4.3 Product Diﬀerentiation
In this section, we extend our results to another commonly used demand structure, where issues
of product diﬀerentiation become important. Speciﬁcally, we have characterized v as the absolute
valuation for the good which naturally has an interpretation in terms of the elasticity of demand.
However, an alternative approach to modeling demand (as in Hotelling) is to consider the goods as
substitutes where v proxies for the elasticity of substitution between them. In particular, assume
that v now measures the speciﬁcity of tastes for one good over another, in the spirit of Hotelling.
More speciﬁcally, assume that ﬁrm i has demands for either good i or good j. Each market here
is modeled as a unit line segment with each supplying ﬁrm situated at one of the endpoints. Each
consumer is predisposed to like one good more than the other in the following sense. Consider ﬁrm
A. In the previous subsection it valued good B at v and good C at s(v). Here we assume that v
measures the relative merits for two goods, where a consumer with v = 1 has good B as his ideal
good, while those with type v = 0 have good C as the ideal good. Following Hotelling, we assume
that a consumer with “location” v receives consumer surplus of k + v from his preferred good and
k − v from his less preferred good. This is a standard Hotelling set-up where we can consider the
situation of ﬁrm A as ideal for type v = 1 while consumers who have v = 1
2 are indiﬀerent between
the two goods. In our previous description of the multilateral barter market, we lacked a double
coincidence of wants by assuming that no bilateral exchange involved both parties getting their
preferred good. We retain this analogy here by assuming that for each agent v > 1
2, so that all
agents have diﬀerent preferred goods; A prefers B over C, B prefers C over A, and C prefers A over
22B. However in this case as v varies, agents are becoming closer to indiﬀerent over their ultimate
allocation. As a consequence, the net value of the barter market is given by
∆(v,α) ≡ k + (1 − γ)v − γv − c − [α + (1 − α)Φ](v + k − c) > 0,
where now the cash market price is assumed to be the monopoly-distorted price of p = v+k rather
than the p = v given previously.
Once again, we can show that barter can be used both to provide liquidity and to segment
the market. However, an important aspect of this demand structure is that market segmentation
becomes more likely than in the case with simple salvage values which are independent of type.
The reason for this is that with diﬀerentiated products, barter can serve to segment the market
not only on willingness to buy but additionally on the elasticity of substitution between goods.
In eﬀect, those who value one good less value others more, something that makes segmentation
easier, an eﬀect which was absent in the previous section. Essentially the barter market is akin
to a randomization over the goods that the ﬁrms ultimately attain. Firms which have valuation v
are closer to indiﬀerent between which good they receive, so it is easier to induce them to accept
a lottery over goods than for a ﬁrm with more speciﬁc tastes (i.e., v = v). Therefore, we have yet
another reason why ﬁrms can use barter to segment the market; here they segment based on the
fact that some agents have lower elasticities of substitution than others, and barter markets have
the feature that they involve more random allocations that cash markets, thus allowing separation.
Example: Consider the following numerical example in which v = 1, v = 10, c = 0, and k = v.
23Figure 7. Equilibria with Product Diﬀerentiation
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5 Does Competition Eliminate Segmentation?:Dual Barter Mar-
ket Equilibria
A recurring theme in economics is that better institutions tend to ultimately dominate their less
eﬃcient counterparts. In this section, we consider whether the introduction of a more eﬃcient
barter market (λ close to 1) drives out its less eﬃcient counterpart. As we have argued above,
barter markets must be suﬃciently ineﬃcient for market segmentation to operate. If this is the
24case, does the advent of a more eﬃcient barter exchange (where supplies are posted, markets are
thick, and swaps can occur at little deadweight loss) necessarily lead to the disappearance of less
eﬃcient (and hence market segmenting) barter markets?
We study this problem in the following way: suppose that in addition to the market in Section 3,
as also add a barter market which is characterized by complete eﬃciency in swaps, so that agents
always get their desired good if they trade; i.e., λ = 1. Since this is the most eﬃcient market
possible, it will attract high valuation customers with the greatest likelihood as they have little to
lose in consumption value. In this setting, if the ineﬃcient (λ < 1) barter market survives, in the
sense that some ﬁrms use it rather than the eﬃcient market, we can be conﬁdent that our results
are robust even to the introduction of an extremely eﬃcient barter exchange. This is indeed the
case.
Rather than consider the extensive set of possible equilibrium conﬁgurations (there are 50
pure-strategy conﬁgurations), we content ourselves at this early stage of research with examples
of three distinct conﬁgurations which are pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes for a wide range of
parameter values: (i) type (v,α) ﬁrm barters in the eﬃcient exchange while type (v,α) barters on
the ineﬃcient exchange; (ii) type (v,α) ﬁrm barters in the eﬃcient exchange while types (v,α) and
(v,α) barter on the ineﬃcient exchange; (iii) type (v,α) ﬁrm barters in the eﬃcient exchange while
the remaining three types barter on the ineﬃcient exchange.
A simple example of these three equilibrium conﬁgurations as a function of parameters of
dispersion, δ, and barter ineﬃciency, λ, is provided in Figure 7 below for the case in which v = 1,
v = 4, and c = 0.
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Even with this limited set of example conﬁgurations, a few important results present themselves.
First, there are a number of diﬀerent instances in which the ineﬃcient barter market continues to
operate in conjunction with its eﬃcient counterpart. In these instances, the eﬃcient market does
not drive out its less eﬃcient counterpart. This necessarily implies a market segmentation role
for barter trade, since if trade occurred for liquidity reasons, all ﬁrms would go to the eﬃcient
market. Second, in the three conﬁgurations, the ineﬃcient barter market can only survive if there
is a suﬃciently large dispersion of shocks, so that once again we feel that market segmentation is
most likely to arise in circumstances where ﬁrms face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
6 Conclusions
Barter typically plays a rather secondary role as a straw man in economic theory, generally being
used as an ineﬃcient benchmark against which the merits of money are usually compared. Yet
through barter exchanges, local currencies and countertrade, it continues to play an active role in
economic exchange. Our objective in this paper has been to understand why such a supposedly
poor means of exchange continues to play a role in monetized economies. Our interest here is as
much conceptual as empirical, since from an early stage of our careers, economists are taught to
shun the swapping of good for other goods. In this paper we argue that barter plays two roles
which may in fact make it a desirable means of exchange. First, and rather obvious, for agents who
have no money, they can attempt to use their own goods as the means of exchange as they have
26little else. This liquidity generating role for money is of little conceptual interest if that was the
only purpose that barter serves. We illustrate that a second reason for barter is that it can serve
to segment markets on the basis of willingness to pay. Put simply, liquidity constrained ﬁrms can
only plausibly prove themselves to be such by being willing to place excess inventory on the barter
market.
Although we know of no other research which has identiﬁed the choice over diﬀerent means
of exchange as a mechanism for facilitating trade via segmentation, there are nonetheless a few
related literatures which are worth noting. First, following Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), a sizeable
literature has addressed the role for ﬁat money in various matching and search-theoretic environ-
ments and its value over barter in eliminating the double-coincidence-of-wants problem.17 In this
research, the emphasis is on how money can overcome search or matching frictions. Williams and
Wright (1994), and Banerjee and Maskin (1996) provide related models of ﬁat money which also
provide theoretical foundations for Gresham’s law. Both papers demonstrate that in absence of
ﬁat money, socially-ineﬃcient low-quality goods are produced which serve as a form of commodity
money in a barter economy. More relevant, Ellingsen (1998) notes that barter can be used as a liq-
uidity device in tandem with money, allowing ﬁrms without money to purchase goods using costly
barter transactions. In a second line of research, the work of Ellingsen and Stole (1996) is similar to
our own in that they begin with a limited no-trade-creation result and then consider the strategic
choice by national governments to mandate barter (i.e., countertrade) relationships between their
domestic ﬁrms and their foreign counterparts; the present work shares a similar starting point, but
is concerned only with voluntary barter relationships where the means of exchange is endogenous
between the parties to the transaction. Third, a literature has emerged which examines interme-
diated trade in matching-theoretic models; Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Bhattacharya and
Hagerty (1989), Bose and Pingle (1995), and Bose (1996). This literature shares similarities with
this paper in that we allow intermediation in the form of a barter market as a means of facilitating
trade.18 Here, however, we emphasize the important information role of barter in contrast to sim-
ple intermediation as the key source of market segmentation. A fourth literature has explored the
prevalence of trade credit among small businesses. (See, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1997),
Biais and Grollier (1997), and Mian and Smith (1994) for evidence, theoretical models, and related
citations.) It is worth mentioning here that according to Mian and Smith (1994), that “for 3550
17For example, Kiyotaki and Wright (1991,1993), Trejos and Wright (1991), and Aiyagari and Wallace (1992).
Matsuyama, et al. (1993), build on this work to understand which of multiple national monies will emerge in
equilibrium exchange between nations.
18Bose and Pingle (1995) also generate market segmentation in a dual exchange equilibrium. In their complete
information setting, patient ﬁrms trade in bilateral negotiated-price meetings and the remainder of the economy visits
“stores” to obtain goods at intermediated prices. We consider a diﬀerent set of trading institutions which diﬀer over
the means of exchange rather than the form of intermediation.
27non-ﬁnancial NASDAQ ﬁrms covered by COMPUTSTAT, accounts payable were 26% of corporate
liabilities at the end of 1992.” Hence, the importance of trade credit is not to be discounted, and
the insights of the present work may have a more general value.
It is worth concluding here by making a few remarks on our modeling strategy and some
extensions of the paper. First note that we have required ﬁrms to place goods on the barter market
before the ultimate resolution of demand. If we were to reverse the order, so that ﬁrms know for
sure whether they have excess inventory, then there would be an obvious liquidity role for barter,
but by assumption. We feel that this would be unreasonable as we would be simply saying that
barter arises solely for liquidity reasons. There would no longer be a role for barter as a means of
market segmentation, since the relevant single crossing property is not satisﬁed. Consequently, we
chose the timing both to reduce the likelihood of barter and also to reﬂect the primary concern of
ﬁrms entering the barter market; namely, the danger that the item that was placed on the barter
exchange might have been purchased on the cash market.
Second, note that we have allowed ﬁrms to have no access to credit markets. However, a natural
extension of our model would be to allow bilateral credit arrangements, where selling ﬁrms could
delay payment on goods until the time that the buyer has cash. This strategy, which is addressed
in a diﬀerent context by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), could provide an alternative way for ﬁrms
to overcome their liquidity constraints, and so not rely on the barter market. But remember here
that in some cases welfare is increased by barter arrangements as it allows them to overcome the
no-trade theorem result of Section 2. Consequently, it is unclear under what terms ﬁrms would
indeed oﬀer such credits to one another and whether such credits will eliminate barter markets.
Another tack would be to consider one-way trades and the role of trade credit as a mechanism
to price discriminate. A simple description of this sort of price discrimination strategy in which
a monopolistic seller’s oﬀer of trade credit reduces the eﬀective price to low-quality borrowers
who by assumption are more price sensitive is provided in Petersen and Rajan’s (1997) study of
trade credit relationships among small business. They ﬁnd empirical evidence consistent with this
strategy: ﬁrms with high margins are more likely to extend trade credit. A more general theory
along the lines of the the present work would shed light on the eﬀects of networks of trade credit
and perhaps the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation (local monopoly power) on ﬁnal product and
trade-credit allocations.
Third, we have not allowed ﬁrms to exercise monopoly power on the barter markets. In other
words, ﬁrms must swap one-for-one on this market. Since relative cash prices are unity, the barter
exchange rate is consistent with the market rate. But ﬁrms could conceivably try to demand better
terms of trade on these markets in the same way as they do in the cash market. It is not clear how
28this market will ﬁnd equilibrium where all ﬁrms are stating prices in terms of the goods of others,
who in turn are stating monopoly terms for their goods. It remains the case that the intermediated
barter exchanges that we have alluded to in the paper make attempts to constrain price demands
on the barter market, by requiring that prices cannot be higher than on cash markets (in our
model, this implies a one-for-one swap). However, at a basic conceptual level, it would be useful to
consider the eﬀects of such monopoly power, to identify whether monopoly distortions vary with
the medium of exchange.
Finally, note that throughout the paper we have assumed that prices were chosen always to
equal v. This plays two roles in the model. First, it implies that there are monopoly distortions,
which is a central theme that generates welfare eﬀects of barter. However, it also plays a secondary
role in that ﬁrms which are credit constrained do not change their prices. Therefore, at a basic
level they have some control over their cash constraints as they could reduce prices if they chose.
This is important here as we require that agents must go to the barter market in some cases to
reveal that they are truly liquidity constrained. But in an environment where ﬁrms change their
prices if they are liquidity constrained, this need not be the case as ﬁrms may be able to identify
whether they are liquidity constrained from their prices. Our assumptions ensure that this is not
the case, so that barter is the only means by which to reveal type. More generally, however, this
paper addresses reason why credit constraints cannot simply be corrected by changes in the price
level; in monopoly circumstances, such price reductions may simply not be incentive compatible.
29Appendix: Proofs of Results
Proof of Theorem 1: Let Ui(vA,vB) represent the indirect utility (consumer and producer
surplus) of ﬁrm i given it has demand parameter vi and the other ﬁrm has parameter vj; let Ui(vj)
represent the unconditional expectation of this utility over the other ﬁrm’s private information. By
deﬁnition,
UA(vA,vB) + UB(vA,vB) ≡ SA(qA(vA,vB),vA) + SB(qB(vA,vB),vB).
Deﬁne consumer surplus as
CSi(vA,vB) ≡ Ui(vA,vB) − min
vj
Ui(vA,vB),
where min vj Ui(vA,vB) is the indirect utility of the worst type. For simplicity, deﬁne vi ≡
argminvi Uj(vA,vB); note that vi is independent of vj given our separability assumptions. Then,
substitution and taking expectations yields
UA(vB)+UB(vA) ≡ EvA,vB[SA(qA(vA,vB),vA)−CSB(vA)]+EvA,vB[SB(qB(vA,vB),vB)−CSA(vB)].
By deﬁnition, µ∗
i uniquely maximizes EvA,vB[Si(qi(vA,vB),vi)−CSj(vi)] subject to incentive com-
patibility and participation constraints, and so µ∗ uniquely maximizes the right-hand side above
subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints. As such, µ∗ is interim incentive
eﬃcient. Moreover, it is undominated for ﬁrm i because it maximizes ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁts
subject to participation of ﬁrm j (a necessary condition being that the worst type of ﬁrm j receives
utility equal to that provided by µ∗).
The second result of the theorem that the mechanism is “safe” follows immediately from the
fact that the ﬁrm’s private information only enters directly in the determination of the ﬁrm’s con-
sumer surplus and not its proﬁts. As such, given any monopoly nonlinear pricing allocation, µ∗, if
it is known that ﬁrm j has a demand parameter of vi, the mechanism is still incentive compatible
– i.e., ﬁrm j will nonetheless select the allocation {qj(vi),tj(vi)} and ﬁrm i’s selection from ﬁrm
j’s nonlinear pricing schedule is unchanged by ﬁrm j’s demand parameter; the latter would not be
the case if the either ﬁrm’s payoﬀs were not linear in money and therefore the marginal rate of
substitution between q and money depended upon the level of money. ||
Proof of Theorem 2: (sketch) We ﬁrst need to introduce some additional notation to make our
multi-ﬁrm strategic pricing game precise. Let θi be ﬁrm i’s private information vector (note we use
a subscript to denote ﬁrm association with the information rather than the product, in contrast to
elsewhere in the paper). Each ﬁrm is assumed to exclusively control some subset of products (ﬁrm
i’s product line). This implies, among other things, that only ﬁrm i can contract upon qi,j, the
amount of i’s good consumed by ﬁrm j. Let Ib be the set of potential buyers of ﬁrm i’s product line;
let Is be the set of potential sellers to ﬁrm i. Because we have restricted attention to deterministic
mechanisms and constant marginal costs of production, each ﬁrm i’s pricing mechanism oﬀered
to ﬁrm j can be represented by a nonlinear pricing schedule, Pi,j(qi,j); note that this formulation
allows for second- and third-degree price discrimination. We consider the problem of renegotiation
from the point of view of two ﬁrms, i and j, which are a subset of N ﬁrms, k = 1,...,N. From
ﬁrm i’s point of view, the residual utility function of ﬁrm k (k 6= i) is simply






30The associated consumer surplus is
ˆ CS
i
k(qi,k,θk) ≡ ˆ Uk(qi,k,θk) − Pi,k(qi,k),




ˆ Uk(qi,k,θk) − ci(θi)0qi − Fi,
where we use have used our assumption of constant marginal costs. Thus, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt on its
product line is






and expected proﬁt is simply Eθ−i[Πi(qi,θ)]. By assumption, µ∗
i maximizes expected proﬁt subject
to incentive compatibility and participation constraints of its own mechanism, taking µ∗
−i as given.
(Note that oﬀ the equilibrium path, ﬁrm i may cause µ∗
−i to induce false reporting of types or
non-participation.)
Now consider ﬁrm i and j meeting among themselves in a renegotiation game. Note that the
sum of their joint surpluses is simply
ˆ Ui(qi,j,θi) + ˆ Uj(qj,i,θj) − ci(θi)0qi,j − cj(θj)0qj,i = Ui(θc
i,θ
p












i Ui(θi), and the c and p superscripts on the information parameters indicate
whether the information is related to the marginal value of consumption or production, respectively.
Note that because of our assumptions on separability, ˆ CS
j
i and θc
i are both independent of θ
p
i.







j) = ˆ Ui(qi,j,θi) + ˆ Uj(qj,i,θj) − ci(θi)0qi,j − cj(θj)0qj,i − ˆ CS
j
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Following similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we have again that µ∗ is interim incentive
eﬃcient and undominated for each ﬁrm. Safety follows from identical arguments as in Theorem
1. ||
Proof of Theorem 4: We sketch a proof here; the analysis is similar to the second part of
Myerson’s proof of his Theorem 2, (p. 1790). Choose any equilibrium in which there is renego-
tiation to another allocation other than µ∗ for some type proﬁle of types in the economy. Using
the inscrutability principle, we can replace the equilibrium outcome with an inscrutable mechanism
which does not reveal the oﬀering ﬁrm’s type at the time of oﬀer, but only later in the simultaneous
direct revelation game. Such a mechanism must provide at least as much utility for all types of
the oﬀering ﬁrm as the status quo mechanism, µ∗, which can always be implemented (since it is
a strong solution). But since µ∗ is undominated, any renegotiated allocation must provide exactly
the same interim utility for all types of the oﬀering ﬁrm. Lastly, because µ∗ is the component-wise
uniquely optimal proﬁt-maximizing pricing strategy for the ﬁrms, no other mechanism exists which
provides identical interim utility for any individual ﬁrm. Hence, it cannot be renegotiated in any
equilibrium. ||
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the 3-way barter equilibrium. If types (v,α), (v,α) and (v,α)
31barter in equilibrium, the value of Φ is given by Φ = ˆ α2
ˆ α+(1−ˆ α)φ > ˆ α2. Thus,
∆(v,α) = λv − c − (α + (1 − α)Φ) < λv − c − (α + (1 − α)ˆ α2) ≤ v − c − (α + (1 − α)ˆ α2) < 0,
where the last inequality comes from our assumption that absent barter, the monopoly price is
optimally set at p = v. Thus, the (v,α) type does not wish to barter.
Consider the 4-way barter equilibrium. In this case, Φ = ˆ α2, and so a similar argument as
above implies that the (v,α) type does not wish to barter.||
Proof of Theorem 5: Lemma 1 states that only 3 classes of equilibria are potential candidates
for barter. Consider each in turn.
Case 1: {(v,α)} barters. If only the (v,α)-ﬁrm barters, the conditional probability of a ﬁrm selling
a good to a rejected barterer on the cash market is Φ1 = α, the probability that the rejected ﬁrm
obtains a cash sale from his own customer. The following three incentive conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient to insure the existence of this type of equilibrium:
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≥ 0,
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≤ 0,
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≤ 0.
Because ∆(v,α) is decreasing in α, the third condition implies that ∆(v,α) < 0, so we may ignore
this latter condition. Simplifying these conditions in terms of their implications for λ, we have
1
v




[c + (v − c)(2 − α)α],
1
v
[c + (v − c)(α + (1 − α)α)]

< 1.
Case 2: {(v,α),(v,α)} barter. If only the α-ﬁrms barter, the conditional probability of a ﬁrm selling
a good to a rejected barterer on the cash market is Φ1 = ˆ αα, the probability that the rejected ﬁrm
has a high valuation v = v and obtains a cash sale from his own customer. The following two
incentive conditions are necessary and suﬃcient to insure the existence of this type of equilibrium:
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≥ 0,
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≤ 0.
Because ∆(v,α) is increasing in v, the ﬁrst condition implies that ∆(v,α) > 0 and the second
condition implies that ∆(v,α) < 0, so we may ignore these two additional requirements. Simplifying
the above two inequalities in terms of their implications for λ, we have
1
v
[c + (v − c)(α + (1 − α)αˆ α)] ≤ λ ≤
1
v
[c + (v − c)(α + (1 − α)ˆ αα] < 1.
Case 3: {(v,α),(v,α)} barter. If only the v-ﬁrms barter, the conditional probability of a ﬁrm selling
a good to a rejected barterer on the cash market is Φ1 = ˆ α, the probability that the rejected ﬁrm
obtains a cash sale from his own customer. The following two incentive conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient to insure the existence of this type of equilibrium:
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≥ 0,
∆(v,α) = λv − c − [α + (1 − α)α](v − c) ≤ 0.
32Because ∆(v,α) is decreasing in α, the ﬁrst condition implies that ∆(v,α) > 0 and the second
condition implies that ∆(v,α) < 0, so we may ignore these two additional requirements. Simplifying
the above two expressions in terms of their implications for λ, we have
1
v
[c + (v − c)[α + (1 − α)ˆ α] ≤ λ ≤
1
v
[c + (v − c)[α + (1 − α)ˆ α].
Given our maintained assumption that absent a working barter exchange, a ﬁrm would always set
p = v (i.e., (α+(1−α)ˆ α)(v−c) > v−c), the righthand side of the above inequality is greater than
1, giving us the expression of the proposition. Examining the lefthand side of this expression, it is
greater than the righthand sides of the expressions of cases 1 and 2. Hence, the above conditions
are inconsistent with other barter equilibria. ||
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